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Abstract Formal dialogue systems model rule-based interaction between agents and
as such have multiple applications in multi-agent systems and AI more generally.
Their conceptual roots are in formal theories of natural argumentation, of which
Hamblin’s formal systems of argumentation in Hamblin (Fallacies. Methuen, London,
1970, Theoria 37:130–135, 1971) are some of the earliest examples. Hamblin cites the
medieval theory of obligationes as inspiration for his development of formal argu-
mentation. In an obligatio, two agents, the Opponent and the Respondent, engage in an
alternating-move dialogue, where the Respondent’s actions are governed by certain
rules, and the goal of the dialogue is establishing the consistency of a proposition. We
implement obligationes in the formal dialogue system framework of Prakken (Knowl
Eng Rev 21(2):163–188, 2006) using Dynamic Epistemic Logic (van Ditmarsch et al.
in Dynamic epistemic logic, Synthese Library Series. Springer, Berlin, 2007). The
result is a new type of inter-agent dialogue, for consistency-checking, and analyzing
obligationes in this way also sheds light on interpretational and historical questions
concerning their use and purpose in medieval academia.
Keywords Consistency  Dialogue protocol  Dialogue systems  Obligationes
1 Introduction
Rule-based interactions such as dialogues or arguments are ubiquitous and diverse;
they are the basic method of communication between agents. Such interactions are
modeled in artificial intelligence and computer science by formal dialogue systems
(FDSs) and dialogue games (Karunatillake et al. 2009; Maudet 2003; McBurney
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and Parsons 2002; McBurney and Parsons 2009; Prakken 2006). These systems give
formal, and hence potentially implementable, methods for modeling real-life
dialogue situations, such as complex reasoning in legal domains. More generally,
dialogue systems and games are used in multi-agent systems to model distributed
cognition and interaction between intelligent agents, and they can also be used in the
specification of complex software systems and programs (McBurney and Parsons
2009).
The conceptual roots of formal dialogues, however, come not from within AI but
from without. They are located in the sphere of natural argumentation, that is,
philosophical logic, argumentation theory, and rhetoric, and are ‘‘meant to provide
formal structures to represent how a sequence of rational argumentation should
proceed when one party argues with another in an orderly way’’ (Walton 2000,
p. 329). One of the earliest attempts to provide a theory of formal dialogues is
Hamblin (1970, 1971). In Hamblin (1970), Hamblin locates part of the motivation
for his development of formal argumentation in historical formal dialogue systems,
that is, dialogical or disputational settings where explicit rules are given governing
the actions of the participants. One such system of natural argumentation that he
considers in particular is the medieval theory of obligationes, developed in the
thirteenth and fourteenth centuries. In an obligatio, two agents, the Opponent and
the Respondent, engage in an alternating-move dialogue, where the Respondent’s
actions are governed by certain rules, and the goal of the dialogue is, in the most
basic case, to establish the consistency of a proposition. We argue that obligationes
are best modeled by FDSs because of their intrinsic dialogical nature. Furthermore,
taking obligationes from the realm of natural argumentation to the realm of formal
dialogue systems results in the determination of a new type of dialogue system
different from those generally discussed in literature on argumentation, and thus
they make a novel contribution to the formal modeling of dialogue and interaction.
The plan of the paper is as follows. In Sect. 2 we present the medieval theory of
obligationes, focusing specifically on the works of one author, Walter Burley, and
give examples. In Sect. 3 we briefly survey previous work on obligationes, both
formal and philosophical, and motivate modeling obligationes as FDSs by showing
how they can make sense of King’s interpretation of obligationes as a meta-
disputational framework. In Sect. 4 we introduce formal dialogue systems,
following the presentation in Prakken (2006), and show generically how obligati-
ones can be viewed as a formal dialogue system. Before we give a precise
specification of obligationes as FDSs in Sect. 6, we first outline the logic used in the
argumentation, a type of Dynamic Epistemic Logic, in Sect. 5. We discuss the
properties of the protocol we introduce, compare our results with standard types of
FDSs, and define a new type of inter-agent dialogue, for consistency- or feasibility-
checking, in Sect. 7. In Sect. 8 we conclude and point towards future work.
2 Medieval Theories of obligationes
An obligatio is a dialogue between two agents, the Opponent and the Respondent,
where the Opponent puts forward a sequence of propositions, and the Respondent is
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obligated (hence the name) to follow certain rules in his responses to the Opponent’s
propositions. More precisely, the Opponent puts forward an initial statement, called
the positum, which the Respondent can either admit or refuse to admit it. If he
admits it, the obligatio begins. If he does not, no obligatio begins. If the obligatio
begins, the Opponent puts forward propositions and the Respondent has three ways
that he can respond: He can grant or concede the proposition, he can deny the
proposition, or he can doubt it, where ‘doubt’ should be understood as ‘remain
agnostic about’; doubting u does not entail any commitment to :u: (Some authors,
such as Ockham (1974) and the anonymous author of the Obligationes Parisienses
(de Rijk 1975), mention a fourth option, which is to ‘draw distinctions’, that is, to
clarify an ambiguity on the part of the Opponent.) The obligatio continues until the
Opponent calls ‘‘Cedat tempus’’ (‘‘Time’s up’’), whereupon the responses of the
Respondent are analysed with respect to the Respondent’s obligations, to determine
whether he has responded well or badly.
The earliest texts on obligationes date from the beginning of the thirteenth
century (de Rijk 1974, 1975, 1976), and many of the leading logicians from that
century and the next wrote treatises on the subject. While the roots of obligational
disputations are clearly grounded in Aristotle’s discussion of dialectical exchanges
in the Topics VIII, 4 (159a15–24) and in the Prior Analytics I, 13 (32a18–20) (cf.
(Yrjo¨nsuuri 1994 §II.A)), the systematic development of the theory of obligationes
over the course of the 13th and 14th centuries tends to show little adherence to the
Aristotelian tradition and definitions. While the specific details vary from author to
author, a number of distinct types of obligationes discussed by multiple authors can
be identified. The six most common are positio, depositio, dubitatio, sit verum or rei
veritatis, institutio, and petitio. Of these six, positio is universally the most widely
studied, both by medieval and modern authors; as a result, it is the focus of the
current paper. For further information on obligationes, including a discussion of
their purpose and their role in medieval philosophy, see Uckelman (2012);
Yrjo¨nsuuri (1994).
To make the above more precise, we look at the theory of obligationes of a
specific writer, Walter Burley. Burley’s treatise De obligationibus, written around
1302, gives a standard treatment of positio. The text of this treatise is edited in
Burley (1963) and a partial translation of the text, including the section on positio in
its entirety, is found in Burley (1988). Burley defines the general goal of an
obligatio as follows:
The opponent’s job is to use language in a way that makes the respondent
grant impossible things that he need not grant because of the positum. The
respondent’s job, on the other hand, is to maintain the positum in such a way
that any impossibility seems to follow not because of him but rather because
of the positum (Burley 1988, p. 370).1
1 ‘‘Opus opponentis est sic inducere orationem ut faciat respondentem concedere impossibilia quae
propter positum non sunt necessaria concedere. Opus autem respondentis est sic sustinere positum ut
propter ipsum non videatur aliquod impossibile sequi, sed magis propter positum. Igitur intentio
opponentis et respondentis circa enuntiabile versatur ad quod respondens est obligatus’’ (Burley 1963,
p. 34).
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Thus, it is clear that in an obligatio, the goal is consistency, not logical truth or
validity. In positio, the primary obligation of the Respondent is to grant, that is, to
hold as true, the positum. If the Respondent accepts the positum and the obligatio
begins, he is obliged to follow the following rules:
1. Everything that is posited and put forward in the form of the positum during the
time of the positio must be granted (Burley 1988, p. 379).2
2. Everything that follows from the positum must be granted. Everything that
follows from the positum either together with an already granted proposition (or
propositions), or together with the opposite of a proposition (or the opposites of
propositions) already correctly denied and known to be such, must be granted
(Burley 1988, p. 381).3
3. Everything incompatible with the positum must be denied. Likewise, every-
thing incompatible with the positum together with an already granted
proposition (or propositions), or together with the opposite of a proposition
(or the opposites of propositions) already correctly denied and known to be
such, must be denied (Burley 1988, p. 381).4
In Rule 1, ‘in the same form as’ should be understood syntactically; if the
positum is ‘Marcus is Roman’, then the Respondent doesn’t have an obligation to
accept ‘Tullius is Roman’ unless it is explicit (either through common knowledge or
through previous concessions) that Marcus is Tullius.5 In Rules 2 and 3, the clause
‘‘known to be such’’ indicates a public (and hence testable) phenomenon; it is not a
reference to the Respondent’s knowledge alone, but to the common knowledge of
the Respondent and Opponent.
Burley also defines a notion of relevance of propositions which applies to all
types of obligatio. A proposition is irrelevant or impertinent if neither it nor its
negation follows from the set of propositions which have already been conceded
(which includes the negations of propositions which have been denied).
• Rule for Irrelevant Propositions One must reply to what is irrelevant in
accordance with its own quality (Burley 1988, p. 375).6
2 ‘‘Omne positum, sub forma positi propositum, in tempore positionis, est concedendum’’ (Burley 1963,
p. 46).
3 ‘‘Omne sequens ex posito est concedendum. Omne sequens ex posito cum concesso vel cum concessis,
vel cum opposito bene negati vel oppositis bene negatorum, scitum esse tale, est concedendum’’ (Burley
1963, p. 48).
4 ‘‘Omne sequens ex posito est concedendum. Omne sequens ex posito cum concesso vel cum concessis,
vel cum opposito bene negati vel oppositis bene negatorum, scitum esse tale, est concedendum’’ (Burley
1963, p. 48).
5 Burley says, ‘‘The clause ‘put forward in the form of the positum’ is used because if [something] is put
forward in a form other than the form of the positum, it need not be granted. For example, if ‘Marcus’ and
‘Tully’ are names of the same man, and it is posited that Marcus is running, one need not grant that Tully
is running’’ (Burley 1988, p. 379) (‘‘Et ponitur haec particula: sub forma positi propositum, quia, si
proponatur sub alia forma quam sub forma positi, non oportet quod concedatur. Ut si Marcus et Tullius
sint nomina eiusdem, et ponatur Marcum currere, non oportet concedere Tullium currere’’ (Burley 1963,
§C.1.a).).
6 ‘‘Similiter, ad impertinens respondendum est secundum sui qualitatem’’ (Burley 1963, p. 42).
146 S. L. Uckelman
123
I.e., the Respondent should reply by conceding the proposition if it is true, by
denying if it is false, and by doubting if he does not know which is the case. The
notion of ‘relevance’ in obligationes parallels the concept of ‘support’ in formal
argumentation theory where an argument is defined as a pair A = (S, p) where S is a
consistent subset of the knowledge base such that Sp (cf., e.g., (Cogan et al. 2006,
p. 155)).7
Because ‘I don’t know’ (or ‘I doubt it’, or ‘Prove!’ (Proba!)) is an acceptable
answer in an obligational disputation, it is thus clear that the moves in an
obligational disputation cannot be understood as the Opponent asking simple yes/no
questions, since ‘‘[a] yes-no question admits of only two direct answers—the
affirmative answer (yes) and the negative answer (no). A yes-no question is
designed to rule out the option ‘I don’t know’ as an answer or acceptable reply’’
(Walton 2000, p. 335).
A simple example illustrating Burley’s rules for positio is given in Table 1.
Suppose u does not imply :w and u is known to be contingently false. In the first
round, the Opponent puts forward a contingent (but false) proposition, u; the
Respondent grants it in accord with Rule 1. In the second round, either u implies
w, then the sentence :u _ w is relevant and follows from U0 (the set of propositions
conceded so far along with the negations of propositions denied to this point); or it
doesn’t follow, in which case it is irrelevant and true (since u is false). In both cases,
the Respondent is required to concede; the first case falls under Rule 2, and the
second under the Rule for Irrelevant Propositions. In the third round, the
Respondent likewise must concede because w follows from U1: This example
obligatio shows how, given a positum which is false but not contradictory, the
Opponent can force the Respondent to concede any other consistent proposition.
More interesting examples, such as the example in Table 2, involve statements
about the obligational rules themselves. Let u be the proposition ‘you are in Rome’
(spoken by the Opponent to the Respondent). The positum is a disjunction between a
simple proposition and the assertion that that proposition must be granted. Because
the disjunction is not a logical contradiction (in particular the first disjunct is
possible, though it is in fact false), the Respondent is correct in accepting the
positum. The second disjunct is irrelevant, as it is not a logical consequence of the
positum, and furthermore it is false: Since u is false, and u is also irrelevant, the
Respondent is not under any obligation to accept u: Thus it is false that u must be
Table 1 An example obligatio
Opponent Respondent
1 u I admit it U0 :¼ fug
2 :u _ w I grant it U1 :¼ fu;:u _ wg
3 w I grant it
7 This definition of relevance was standard until Roger Swyneshed redefined the term in his Obligationes,
written between 1330 and 1335; thereafter some authors followed Burley and others Swyneshed. See
(Uckelman 2012, §4) for a full discussion of this.
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granted, so he correctly denied the second proposition. The third proposition
expresses a logical necessity, about the validity of disjunctive syllogism, and so is
accepted. But now it is unclear how the Respondent should respond to the re-
assertion that u must be granted. On the one hand, this proposition has been put
forward before, and was denied, and so it should continue to be denied. On the other
hand, once the third proposition has been granted, by Rule 2, u must be granted. So
superficially it appears that the Respondent is obliged to both accept and deny this
final statement. Burley’s resolution to the problem is to argue that (3) is not only not
necessary, but it is repugnant, since it is inconsistent with the opposite of (2). Since
it is repugnant, the Respondent should have in fact denied it, and thus (4) can also be
denied without contradiction (Yrjo¨nsuuri 1994, pp. 152–155).
3 Previous Work on obligationes
Green’s Ph.D. dissertation, containing an edition of and commentary on two
treatises on obligationes, now generally ascribed to William of Sherwood and
Walter Burley, marks the beginning of modern research on obligationes.8 Since
then, many philosophers and historians have devoted themselves to the question of
the goal or purpose of obligational disputations and the role they played in medieval
academic life, while somewhat fewer have focused on the logical properties of
obligationes. Despite this, the purpose of obligationes and their role in medieval
academic life remains stubbornly unclear (Spade 2000, 2008). Two recent sources
which discuss the various views, which range from the view that obligationes were
mere academic exercises, that they were used for counter-factual reasoning, that
they were a tool for evaluating sophismata and insolubilia (paradoxical and
problematic sentences), that they are thought experiments, and that they provide a
theory of belief revision, are Yrjo¨nsuuri (1994, 2001).
Hamblin is the first modern author to attempt to formalize obligationes (Hamblin
1970, pp. 260–263). Given his interest in formalizing argumentation generally, he
focuses on the dialogical aspects of obligationes. His formalization is rudimentary
and models only one variant, that given by William of Sherwood,9 but it marks the
Table 2 A more interesting example
Opponent Respondent
1 u or u must be granted I admit it
2 u must be granted I deny it
3 u follows from the positum and the opposite of something correctly denied I grant it
4 u must be granted ??
8 While Boehner mentioned obligationes in the beginning of Boehner (1952), it wasn’t until Green’s
dissertation that obligationes were researched widely or in any depth.
9 Hamblin routinely questions the attribution to Sherwood of the text he is considering; however, more
recent scholarship is agreed that the text was almost certainly written by Sherwood, sometime in the
middle of the thirteenth century (Braakhuis 1998).
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beginning of modern scholarship on the formal properties of obligationes. Recent
scholarship has focused on the game-like nature of obligationes, e.g., de Rijk
(1975); Dutilh Novaes (2007); Yrjo¨nsuuri (1994). In particular, there is an
immediate apparent similarity between obligationes and Lorenzen’s dialogical logic
(Lorenzen and Lorenz 1978). It may therefore seem natural to look to game-based
structures in logic to provide a general framework for modeling different types of
obligationes. However, there are a number of aspects which do not immediately
lend themselves nicely to a game-like interpretation (e.g., the notion of a winning
strategy for an obligatio, for example, is difficult to define10; see Uckelman (2011b)
for a further discussion of the issues comparing obligationes with Lorenzen
dialogue games.), and despite the strongly logical component of obligationes, to
date relatively little work has been done on the formal properties of the logic
involved and few attempts have been made to provide an explicit specification of
the game(s) involved.
The most extensive attempt is in Dutilh Novaes (2007). In this book, Dutilh
Novaes analyses the obligational theories of three authors, Walter Burley, Richard
Swyneshed (c.1330), and Ralph Strode (second half of the 14th C), giving separate
formalizations for each one. Her formalizations are based on models M ¼
hKc; U; C; RðuÞi where Kc is the set of common knowledge among the participants
of the disputation (expressed as a set of propositions); U is a sequence of
propositions, which keeps track of the assertions of the Opponent; C is a sequence of
propositions, which keeps track of the responses of the Respondent; and RðuÞ is a
function from u to 1 (standing for ‘concede’), 0 (‘deny’), and ? (‘doubt’). These
formalizations are not very satisfying for a number of reasons. Each obligational
theory studied is provided with a different framework, which means that it is
difficult to make cross-theory comparisons. Further, only positio is studied; the
other types of obligationes are not discussed. While in the present paper we also
focus solely on positio, we have shown elsewhere (Uckelman 2011a) how the
variant dubitatio can be treated within the framework defined in §5. Additionally,
Dutilh Novaes’s frameworks all presuppose a significant amount of background
information which is taken for granted and never specified: the semantic model(s) in
which truth of propositions (particularly the positum and irrelevant propositions)
and the Respondent’s knowledge of both individual propositions as well as how the
consequence relations are to be evaluated, and the syntactic rules governing ‘
(which is used to generate C). For example, the set of common knowledge KC is not
defined in any explicit fashion, and there is nothing which grounds the knowledge of
the participants. Finally, since the nature of the proof system being used in the
definition of RðuÞ is never specified, her frameworks are essentially incomplete; it is
impossible to implement the logical model without making the proof-system
explicit (Dutilh Novaes 2007, p. 169).
When looking for an alternative to a game-theoretic approach to modeling
obligationes, one fruitful suggestion that presents itself can be rooted in a
10 Yrjo¨nsuuri mentions the possibility of modeling obligationes as games, but he says that ‘‘defining the
results of the game in any manner appropriate to modern game-theory seem utterly problematic’’ though
despite this ‘‘[i]n the following I will keep to the English word game, assuming that the problems pointed
out above can just be left unsolved’’ (Yrjo¨nsuuri 1994, pp. 9–10).
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particularly interesting interpretation of obligationes given by King (1991, 2004). In
King (2004), King takes his starting point from Spade, who, in Spade (1993), looked
to the textual evidence for actual uses of obligationes to understand how they were
used by the medievals. While to date there is no historical record for actual
obligational disputations, we have many examples of philosophers using obliga-
tional techniques as part of their argumentation (King 2004, p. 1). King explains the
apparent ‘‘content-freeness’’ of obligational disputations by pointing out that ‘‘they
operate at a higher level of logical generality than that at which substantive debate
occurs. If this is correct, then actual obligational moves—perhaps even recognized
as such—are the vehicle whereby real argument takes place’’ (King 2004, p. 6), and
thus obligationes provide a ‘‘meta-methodology’’ for reasoning (King 2004, p. 7).
We use this suggestion as the motivation for our approach to modeling
obligationes. An obligatio is essentially a dialogue; and any dialogue can be seen as
a game played according to the rules specified by a FDS (Maudet 2003). We believe
that viewing obligationes as FDSs, which require that we explicitly specify the logic
of argumentation/inference and the models against which the dialogue is to be
evaluated, provide a more fruitful approach to modeling obligationes. On this view,
Hamblin’s modeling approach has the advantage over others proposed in recent
literature because it takes the dialogical nature of the disputation seriously. By
varying the rules governing the disputation, radically different types of obligationes
arise, which result in radically different types of dialogues/disputations. Despite the
wide range of difference that can be found, the basic structure of an obligatio
remains the same, making the general framework of FDSs an appropriate modeling
choice. Specifying obligationes from within the context of FDSs allows us to situate
them formally in current research on formal dialogues, which in turn can help to
clarify the interpretational question, by helping us understand the possible purposes
to which obligationes could be disposed. In particular, we argue that the naturalness
of modeling obligationes as dialogue systems supports King’s suggestion that
obligationes provide agents with a meta-methodology for argumentation. That is,
obligationes give frameworks within which dialectical argumentation—dialogue—
can take place.
4 Formal Dialogue Systems
The standard taxonomy of formal dialogue systems is based on the argumentation-
based typology given Walton and Krabbe (1995), who identify six different basic
types of dialogues: information seeking, inquiry, persuasion, negotiation, deliber-
ation, and eristic. The division is made on the basis of the preconditions and
postconditions that must hold for successful dialogue to take place (Cogan et al.
2006; McBurney and Parsons 2009). Three of these classes, information seeking,
inquiry, and persuasion, deal with beliefs and knowledge, and thus are of especial
interest, particularly persuasion dialogues, which are ‘‘[t]he only kind of dialogue
about p in which one can engage when one knows p’’ (Cogan et al. 2006, pp. 161–
162). Walton and Krabbe make no claim as to the comprehensiveness of their
classification, and others (Baker 2000; Cogan et al. 2005, 2006; Girle 1996;
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Ravenscroft and Matheson 2002; Sklar and Parsons 2004) have researched types not
covered in the Walton and Krabbe typology. In particular, Cogan et al. argue that
‘‘there remain several situations in which it seems natural to engage in dialogues,
but to which the basic Walton and Krabbe dialogue types do not apply’’ (Cogan
et al. 2006, p. 161). In Cogan et al. (2005, 2006), they take a systematic approach to
defining dialogue types on the basis of pre- and post-conditions, and extend Walton
and Krabbe’s list of belief-based dialogues with four new types, verification and
three types of queries. In Sect. 7, we discuss how obligationes fit into these different
types. First, we make precise what we mean by a formal dialogue system.
In this section, we follow the presentation of formal dialogue systems given in
Prakken (2006), an overview paper which discusses different formal argumentation
systems that have been proposed for the analysis of persuasion dialogues and
provides a unified approach within which each of these different systems can be
modeled. While Prakken focuses on persuasion dialogues, his framework is in fact
general enough to handle other types as well (Prakken 2006, pp. 170, 173). Thus, it
is appropriate to use it to consider obligationes.
The specification of a formal dialogue system contains the following elements
(Prakken 2006, p. 166):
• A topic language Lt; closed under classical negation.
• A communication language Lc: We denote the set of dialogues, that is, the set
sequences of Lc; by M1; and the set of finite sequences of Lc by M\1: For a
dialogue d ¼ m0; . . .; mn; . . .; the subsequence m0; . . .; mi is denoted di.
• A dialogue purpose or goal.
• A set A of agents (participants) and a set R of roles that the participants can
occupy. Each participant a has a (possibly empty) belief base Ra  Lt and a
(possibly empty) commitment set CaðdnÞ  Lt: The belief base may or may not
change during the dialogue; the commitment set usually does.
• A context K  Lt; representing the (shared, consistent, and unchanging)
knowledge of the agents specified at the outset.
• A logic L for Lt:
• A set E of effect rules CaðdnÞ : M\1 ! PðLtÞ for Lt; specifying how utterances
u 2 Lc in the dialogue affect the commitment stores of the agents. The effect
rules are such that if d = d0 then Ca(d, m) = Ca(d0, m), that is, the changes in
commitments are determined solely by the most recent move in the dialogue
along with the commitments at that step.
• A protocol P for Lc; specifying the legal moves of the dialogue, which is a
function from the context and a non-empty D  M\1 to PðLcÞ; satisfying the
requirement that if d 2 D and m 2 PðdÞ; then d; m 2 D: The elements of D are
called legal finite dialogues, and P(d) is the set of moves allowed after move d.
At any stage, if P(d) = ;, then the dialogue has terminated. A protocol will
often be accompanied by a turn-taking function T : D ! PðAÞ; which takes a
finite dialogue dn and specifies who governs move mn?1, and termination
conditions, which specify when P(d) = ;.
• A set of outcome rules O.
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In this list of components, we can identify the four fundamental building blocks
of any formal dialectical system named by Walton: (1) the two participants, called
the proponent and the respondent, (2) the types of moves (taking the form of various
speech acts) that the two participants are allowed to make, as each takes his or her
turn to speak, (3) the sequence of moves, in which the appropriateness of each move
depends on the type of preceding move made by the other part, (4) the goal of the
dialogue as a whole (Walton 2000, p. 334). In a FDS, we do not restrict ourselves to
merely two participants, and of course what we call them is irrelevant. The
communication language governs (2), and the protocol specifies (3). The dialogue
purpose is (4).
Dialogue systems can be explicitly connected with the games they specify by
defining the agents’ strategies in the standard game-theoretical way. Formally, a
strategy sa for agent a is a function Da ! Lc; where Da  D is the set of all finite
legal dialogues dn in which T(dn) = a. A strategy sa is called winning if in every
dialogue where a follows this strategy, he realizes his dialogue goal.
We can identify a number of properties of protocols (Prakken 2006, p. 170):
• A protocol has public semantics iff the set of legal moves is always independent
from the agents’ belief bases.
• A protocol is context-independent iff the set of legal moves and the outcome is
always independent of the context, that is, P(K, d) = P(;, d).
• A protocol is fully deterministic iff P always returns a singleton or the empty set.
• A protocol is unique-move iff the turn shifts after each move; it is multiple-move
otherwise.
Protocols which are not fully deterministic are permissive, that is, they specify
what moves are legal or allowed for the agent, rather than specify what moves are
required. Thus, obligationes are a type of dialogue system where the protocol for
the Respondent is fully deterministic; for each proposition the Opponent puts
forward, there will be exactly one correct move that the Respondent can make. (In
the second example given in Table 2, there is one correct move for the Respondent,
but the problem is that he fails to make it when he responded to (2).)
We now show how generically obligationes can be viewed as FDSs; we give
precise examples in Sect. 6. In obligationes, there are two designated roles Opp
(Opponent) and Res (Respondent) that members of A can have; those members of
A which do not fill either role are irrelevant for modeling the disputation. We
explain below how ROpp; RRes; COpp; CRes; and the context K are generated. In
Burley-style positio, the dialogue purpose is consistency: If we take Res’s
commitment set to be the set of formulas he has conceded along with the negation of
those that he’s denied over the course of a positio, then the goal for Res is to
maintain the consistency of his commitment set, and the goal for Opp is to force
Res into contradiction.
In general, the topic language Lt and the communication language Lc are the
same. This allows, among other things, the participants in an obligatio to dispute
about the allowed moves of the other players. (For example, Opp may ask Res to
respond to the claim ‘‘You deny u’’.) The turn-taking protocol in an obligatio is
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unique-move: Tð;Þ ¼ Opp; TðdnÞ ¼ Opp if n is odd, and TðdnÞ ¼ Res if n is even.
(Throughout we assume that we label the steps in the sequence from 0, so in an
obligatio it is always Opp that goes first.) The protocol P will be such that the
moves of Opp are not constrained in any way, but Res’s moves must be made in
reaction to the move of Opp at the previous stage. The same will be true for the
effect rules E; in a disputation, Opp makes a series of claims or assertions, but these
actions have no effect on his commitment store. On the other hand, Res is
constrained to be reactive only: He can only concede statements claimed by Opp;
concede their negations, or remain ambivalent. Res never asserts any statement of
his own devising, he only ever responds to propositions put forward by Opp: Thus,
obligationes are essentially asymmetric, in that the rules governing the behavior of
the Opp and Res are disjoint,11 and so are their actions.
The outcome rules for obligationes are simple: If Res realizes the goal, then he
wins. If Opp realizes the goal, then he wins. There is nothing further that hinges
upon winning or losing an obligational disputation (except, of course, the individual
prestige or embarrassment of the participants!).
Above we noted that in an arbitrary dialogue system, the commitment set of an
agent will generally change during the course of the dialogue. It can either strictly
grow, so that the agents are only adding new propositions to their commitment-base
at each turn, or they can also revise their commitments by rejecting previous
commitments in favor of new ones. This latter case arises in ordinary circumstances
when agents utilize a form of default reasoning, which is defeasible and non-
monotonic, in that an agent can be forced to accept information which contradicts
his previous commitments, requiring that his commitments be revised in order to
maintain consistency (cf. Bondarenko et al. (1997); Brewka (2001)). In AI contexts,
the ability to simulate non-monotonic reasoning is of great importance; monotonic
dialogues and discussions are more commonly found in philosophical contexts. One
of the benefits of Prakken’s approach to dialogue systems is that it can handle both
approaches, merely by the specification of the underlying logic (Prakken 2006,
p. 173).
5 The Underlying Logic
By specifying the logic L and its underlying models, we are able to explicitly
generate ROpp; RRes; COpp; CRes; and K satisfying desired properties. In our
approach to modeling obligationes as FDSs, the underlying logic is a variant of
multi-agent Dynamic Epistemic Logic (DEL, van Ditmarsch et al. 2007). This logic
is monotonic and not argument based. An epistemic logic (EL) is an extension of
propositional logic with a family of modal operators Ka for a 2 A: We are interested
11 In fact, in most texts, no rules for Opp are given. One exception is the early text Tractatus Emmeranus
de Rijk (1974), which gives some rules (better thought of as guidelines, or strategic advice) to the
Opponent.
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in a particular extension of standard epistemic logic, namely, epistemic logic with
common knowledge, which has a further family of operators CG, for G  A: For a
set U0 of propositional letters and set A of agents, the set UAEL of well-formed
formulas of EL is defined by:
u :¼ p 2 U0j:uju _ ujKau : a 2 AjCGu : G  A
Kau is read ‘agent a knows that u’. CGu is read ‘it is common knowledge amongst
the group of agents G that u’. CG is used to give an explicit representation of the
knowledge of the two agents at the beginning of the disputation.
The models for epistemic logic are Kripke models. A Kripke model
M ¼ hW ; w; f a: a 2 Ag; Vi is an epistemic model if
• W is a set (of possible worlds), with w 2 W a designated point (representing the
actual world).
• f a: a 2 Ag is a family of equivalence relations on W, one for each member of
A: The relation w*aw0 is interpreted as ‘w and w0 are epistemically equivalent
for agent a’.  G: G  A is defined as the reflexive and transitive closure ofS
a2Gf ag:
• V : U0 ! 2W is a valuation function associating atomic propositions with
subsets of W. For p 2 U0; if w 2 VðpÞ; we say that ‘p is true at w’.
The semantics for the propositional connectives and the epistemic operators are as
follows:
Fig. 1 An example Kripke model
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M; w p iff w 2 VðpÞ
M; w:u iff M; w2u
M; wu ^ w iff M; wu and M; ww
M; wu _ w iff M; wu or M; ww
M; wu ! w iff M; wu implies M; ww
M; wKau iff 8w0ðif hw; w0i 2  a then ME; w0 uÞ
M; wCGu iff 8w0ðif hw; w0 i 2  G then ME; w0 uÞ
An example Kripke model is given in Fig. 1. There are four worlds representing
the four possible combinations of truth values of atoms p and q, and two agents, a
and b. The relationship of epistemic equivalence between worlds is indicated by the
arrows, labeled with the agents. The actual world is the world where :p; q holds
(indicated by the double ring), and agent b knows that this is the actual world. Agent
a, on the other hand, knows that p is false, but is uncertain about the truth of q, and
even if it were the case that p were true, agent b would still be uncertain about q.
Epistemic logic models cover the knowledge of the agents; to model their
actions, we add dynamics, via Propositional Dynamic Logic (PDL, Harel et al.
(2002)). PDL is an extension of propositional logic by a family of modal operators
[a] for a 2 P; a set of programmes (or more generally, a set of actions or events).
The language of PDL is two-sorted, with a set U0 of atoms and a set P0 of atomic
actions. We do not need the full expressivity of PDL to model obligationes, so we
introduce only the fragment we require. We let P0 ¼ ;; and the sets UOb and POb of
complex well-formed formulas and programmes are defined by mutual induction:
u :¼ u 2 UAEL j ½au: a 2 POb
a :¼ u?: u 2 UAEL
The programme u? is to be interpreted as a test operator, which tests for the truth of
u: Note that the only programmes that we allow are testing of formulas which do
not themselves contain any programmes. The semantics for the new ½u? operator
are given in terms of model restriction. Let M u :¼ hWM;u; fM;ua : a 2 Ag;
VM;ui; where WM;u :¼ fw 2 W : M; wug; and the relations and valuation func-
tions are just restrictions of the originals. For a set of ordered propositions Cn; let
M Cn ¼ M  c0      cn; that is, M Cn is the result of the sequential restriction of
M by the elements of Cn: Then:
M; w ½u?w iff 8v 2 M u; vw
We give examples of how these test operators and model restrictions work at the end
of Sect. 6.
One advantage of using an epistemic logic for our disputation logic is that it
allows us to model the epistemic bases of the agents, and the context of the
disputation, explicitly (for a fuller discussion of the advantages, which includes the
ability to use this framework to model different types of obligationes beyond just
the one considered here, see Uckelman (2011b)). While above we defined the
concept of a ‘‘belief base’’ in a dialogue, in the context of obligationes it is the
Medieval Disputationes de obligationibus as Formal Dialogue Systems 155
123
agent’s knowledge, not his beliefs, that is important. Given an epistemic model M;
the knowledge bases of Opp and Res are defined as follows:
RMOpp :¼ fu: M; w KOppug
RMRes :¼ fu: M; w KResug
That is, the knowledge base of the two players is simply the propositions he knows
in the actual world.
In an arbitrary model M; the set of propositions which are common knowledge
amongst a group of agents is not explicitly specified. In an obligatio, the set of
common knowledge, against which the truth of irrelevant propositions is evaluated,
is likewise often left implicit. In some cases, before the obligatio begins, a casus is
introduced.12 A casus is a hypothesis about how the world is, or extra information
about how the positum should be analyzed (Yrjo¨nsuuri 1993). A common example
of a positum introduced with a casus (understood in the first sense) is ‘‘In truth
Socrates is black. It is posited that Socrates is white.’’ The first sentence is the casus;
it tells the participants not only that Socrates is black, but also that he exists, and is
colored, all of which facts the Respondent must take into account when responding
to the Opponent’s posita. Thus, in the first sense, the casus can be understood as a
set of literals expressing the explicit common knowledge at the start of the dialogue,
so the casus can be implemented by a restriction on V.
Definition 1 (Casus) Let LitU0 be the set of literals formed from U0; and K 
LitU0 be the casus. Then M models the casus if there is a Pc  P of W with w 2 Pc;
such that if w Resw; then w 2 Pc; if v Oppw; then v 2 Pc; and for all w; v 2
Pc; w Resv and w Oppv; and for every positive literal p 2 K and every w 2
Pc; w 2 VðpÞ; and for every negative literal :q 2 K and every w 2 Pc; w 62 VðqÞ:
Unlike contexts in dialogue systems, it is not assumed that the casus of an
obligatio is consistent, but if it is not, then Res should not accept the positum, since
Opp could easily force him into conceding a contradiction. However, if the casus is
consistent, we can easily show that if M models a casus K, then for every
u 2 K; MCfOpp;Resgu; and so K  RMOpp and K  RMRes:
6 Protocols, Effect Rules, and Outcomes
Different types of obligationes can be modeled by changing the protocols, effect
rules, and outcome conditions. First, we specify the general properties shared by all
12 The use of the casus is more common in post-Burley treatises; Burley only uses the term in an off-hand
fashion; in one example he says, ‘‘Let it be the case that Socrates is black, and let it be put forward that
Socrates is white. However the case does not constrain [the Respond] but certifies, and because it is
possible to be certain of the truth of one of the opposites and to sustain the other as true, it is possible to
admit a positio in which it is put forward that Socrates is white, when previously it was said in the truth of
things, ‘Socrates is black’ ’’ (‘‘Sit Socrates niger, et ponatur Socratem esse album. Sed casus non obligat
sed certificat, et quia possum esse certus de veritate unius oppositorum et sustinere reliquum pro vero,
potest admitti positio quae ponit Socratem esse album, prius dicto in rei veritate: ‘Socrates est niger’’’
(Burley 1963, §C.1)).
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obligationes. We identify our set of agents with their roles, i.e., our set of agents is
A ¼ fOpp; Resg; and our topic language and commitment language is the
language of Dynamic Epistemic Logic LDEL introduced in the previous section. Let
a be a designated formula representing ‘‘cedat tempus’’. We can identify two types
of protocols used in obligationes. The first type of protocol is uniform throughout all
different systems; the second varies from author to author and type to type.
The uniform protocol Pu is invariant over all contexts and is defined for a finite
dialogue dn:
Puð;Þ ¼ Lc
if mn ¼ a PuðdnÞ ¼ ;
otherwise, if n is odd, PuðdnÞ ¼ Lc
and if n is even, PuðdnÞ ¼ f½mn?>; ½:mn?>; ½>?>g
That is, if it is Opp’s turn, he is allowed to assert any statement in the communi-
cation language (we allow repetitions). If it is Res’s turn, he must either concede,
deny, or doubt Opp’s statement from the previous round. And if ‘‘cedat tempus’’ has
been called, the dialogue ends and there are no more legal moves available. Since
mn, the move of Opp; will always be a statement in the communication language
Lc; and the communication language allows for the embeddings of the test pro-
gramme, this protocol is well-defined. For ease of future reference, we introduce
meta-names for the actions of Res : concede:u :¼ ½un?>; deny:u :¼ ½:un?>;
and doubt:u :¼ ½>?>: The actions of concession and denial are to be understood
as asking (i.e., testing) whether u or :u are consistent. The last action is equivalent
to saying ‘‘I don’t know’’; ½>?> will always be valid, in any model, since > is
necessarily true.
This protocol has public semantics and is context-independent, but it is not fully
deterministic, since whenever it is Res’s turn, he has a choice of actions.
The rules governing the commitment sets COpp and CRes are defined as follows:
for all n COppðdnÞ ¼ ;
if n is even CResðdnÞ ¼ CResðdn1Þ
if n is odd CResðdnÞ ¼ CResðdn1Þ [ fmng
That is, Opp has no commitments, Opp’s moves do not change Res’s commit-
ments, and Res’s commitment store strictly grows on the basis of his actions, and
thus obligational dialogues are monotonic. As above, since Lc and Lt coincide, the
final clause of the definition is well-defined. Note that in general, CRes and RRes will
be disjoint, and similarly for CRes and K (contra, e.g., (Parsons et al. 2002, §3),
where ‘‘an agent’s commitment store is just a subset of its knowledge base’’).
The general protocol defined above specifies what the possible moves of Res are. In
an obligatio, however, we want to say more than what moves are allowed, we also want
to specify a set of possible moves which are in fact required, since in an obligational
disputation Res is under obligation to respond to Opp in certain ways. This is done by
specifying a more refined protocol. Such a protocol, because it makes reference to the
agents’ knowledge bases, will always be defined with respect to a particular DEL
model M: We give as an example Burley’s protocol PBur for positio, introduced in
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Sect. 2. Let Cn be the sequence of Res’s move in a dialogue dn. For a DEL model M
and context K, PBur(K, ;) = Pu(;) and if n is odd, PBur(K, dn) = Pu(dn). For n even,
• For d0 = m0 = the positum,
PBurðK; d0Þ ¼
concede:m0 iff 9w 2 W ; M; wm0
deny:m0 iff 8w 2 W ; M; w2m0
(
• For dn,n [ 0:
If M Cn mn: PBurðK; dnÞ ¼ concede:mn
If M Cn :mn: PBurðK; dnÞ ¼ deny:mn
Otherwise:
If M; wKResmn: PBurðK; dnÞ ¼ concede:mn
If M; wKRes:mn: PBurðK; dnÞ ¼ deny:mn
If M; w:ðKResmn _ KRes:mnÞ: PBurðK; dnÞ ¼ doubt : mn
Finally, we define two outcome rules for Burley-style positio, governing who
wins. Generally speaking, Opp wins if he can force Res into inconsistency, and
Res wins otherwise. Since any individual obligatio = dn for some finite n, we
can define a weak notion of ‘‘local’’ winning: If mn = a, then Opp wins if
M Cn ¼ h;; fM;Cna : a 2 Ag; VM;Cni and Res wins otherwise. But even though
individual obligationes are finite, they are all potentially infinite. This view gives
rise to a ‘‘global’’ winning condition: Opp wins if there is some n such that
M Cn ¼ h;; fM;Cna : a 2 Ag; VM;Cni. Res wins otherwise. In both cases, the only
time W will be empty is when CResu ^ :u; that is, over the course of the
disputation Res has conceded an inconsistent set, and has thus ‘‘responded badly’’.
Thus, protocol PBur ensures the dialogical consistency of Res (cf. Prakken (2006,
p. 171) and Dutilh Novaes (2007, ch. 3)).
There are also two ways that ‘‘responded badly’’ can be explicated, a broad-
grained way and a fine-grained way. On the broad-grained view, we are only
interested in whether Opp or Res has locally won, that is, whether Opp has been
able to force Res to concede a contradiction, or whether Res has remained
consistent in his answers. This is the view generally considered by medieval
authors. However, we may also be interested in a more fine-grained notion of
Fig. 2 M  d1
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correct response, namely, knowing whether Res has actually followed the rules he
was constrained to follow, and not just that he succeeded in maintaining a
contradiction-free stance.
Before we discuss some interesting properties of protocols like the ones
introduced here, we return to the example in Table 1, using the model M given in
Fig. 1 with u ¼ p and w = q. This model is such that there is a
w 2 W ; M; wu ^ w; and it models the casus K ¼ f:ug: The first move is
Opp’s, and he asserts the positum u :¼ d0: According to PBurðd0Þ; Res should
concede:u :¼ d1 (Fig. 2). The protocol now allows Opp to make any assertion he
likes, so he asserts :u _ w :¼ d2: Now, by the argument given above, either
M  d1d2; or, if not, then M; w KResd2: By the protocol, in both cases, Res
should concede and d3 = concede:d2. Then Opp asserts d4 = w, and since
M  d1; d3w; (Fig. 3) Res is again required to respond with concede:d4: = d5.
Then, Opp calls ‘‘cedat tempus’’, and d6 = a, and, by the general protocol Pu there
are no more legal moves and the dialogue ends. Because the final model is
nonempty, Res has succeeded in maintaining consistency, and hence he wins.
7 Discussion
7.1 The Protocol
The protocol PBur defined above is semi-public, as it depends on Res’s knowledge,
but does not depend on Opp’s; context-dependent; and fully deterministic. It also
meets all but four of the 13 desiderata for agent argumentation protocols given in
McBurney et al. (2002). There McBurney et al. consider dialogue protocols from
the point of view of design, and identify 13 desiderata that a designer might want to
incorporate. These are:
• stated dialogue purpose A system should have one or more publicly stated
purpose, and its structure should facilitate its achievement.13
Fig. 3 M  d1; d3
13 Cf. ‘‘The sequence of moves should ideally move towards the fulfillment of the goal as the dialogue
proceeds’’ (Walton 2000, p. 334).
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• diversity of individual purposes Participants should be allowed to have their own
(distinct) purposes, consistent with the stated dialogue purpose.
• inclusiveness Any qualified participant who wants to participate can.
• transparency Participants should know the rules and structure of the system
prior to its commencement.
• fairness Either all participants should be treated equally, or asymmetries in
treatment should be explicit.
• clarity of argumentation theory The dialectical system should conform to a
stated theory of argumentation.
• separation of syntax and semantics The syntax and the semantics of the system
should be defined separately.
• rule-consistency The rules and locutions should not lead to deadlocks or to
infinite cycles of repeated locutions.
• encouragement of resolution Resolution should not be precluded by the rules.
• discouragement of disruption The rules should discourage disruptive behavior,
such as repeating the same locution repeatedly.
• enablement of self-transformation Participants should be able to change their
preferences, knowledge, degrees of belief, etc.
• system simplicity The locutions and rules of the system should be as simple as
possible, consistent with the other desiderata.
• computational simplicity The system should minimize computational demands
on the participants.
In the FDS constructed from Burley’s obligational theory, the dialogue purpose is
stated explicitly (cf. Sect. 2). The purposes of Res and Opp are distinct, and anyone
who is qualified to participate in an obligatio as either Res or Opp may. The rules
are agreed upon in advance, and the asymmetry between Res and Opp is explicit.
The system conforms to a stated theory of argumentation, namely Burley’s rules for
positio. The rules do not preclude resolution, and it is also quite simple, statable in a
case-based structure with minimal cases to consider. Further, to the extent that the
protocol is rule-consistent (which we discuss below), it discourages disruption in
that Res is never able to continuously repeat the same locution, at least, not without
responding badly.
The issue of self-transformation enablement requires further comment. McBur-
ney et al. further specify that self-transformation requires that ‘‘participants should
have the right to retract commitments made earlier in the same dialogue’’ for
otherwise ‘‘in such circumstances, there would be no point for the agents to engage
in dialogue’’ (McBurney et al. 2002, p. 403). We disagree with this assessment; the
obligationes framework provides a counterexample, a type of dialogue which is
worthwhile engaging in but in which the agents’ commitments are monotonic.
Obligationes satisfy the less restrictive view of self-transformation, given that the
commitment sets and responses of Res are flexible and can change over the course
of the disputation.
For the remaining desiderata, because the topic language and the communication
language coincide, it is not clear to what extent obligationes satisfy the requirement
of the separation of syntax and semantics. It does not satisfy rule-consistency or
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discouragement of disruption, because Opp can continually put forward the same
proposition; however, while the protocol allows Opp to act in such a fashion, there
are pragmatic reasons why he will generally not do so. If Res responds well (that is,
follows the protocol), the only time he will change his response to a proposition u is
to move from doubt to either concede or deny. If he has responded badly at some
point, then Opp may by repeating a locution be able to force Res into losing, in
which case there will be no point in Opp repeating that proposition again, as he
should instead call ‘‘Cedat tempus’’. Whether the final criterion is satisfied is
uncertain: As we note in the final section, the computational complexity of certain
decision problems that can be extracted from this protocol is not yet known.
Regardless, the protocol scores quite highly—-as well, or better, than the protocols
analysed in McBurney et al. (2002). It should also be clear that this high score is not
specific to Burley’s protocol: Any other FDS protocol developed from a different
medieval theory would score similarly high.
7.2 Comparison with Other Dialogue Systems
We discussed Walton and Krabbe’s taxonomy of dialogue types, and Cogan et al.’s
extensions, in Sect. 4 before introducing Prakken’s framework. Prakken himself
distinguishes two types of persuasion dialogues, those that are for pure persuasion
and those for conflict resolution (Prakken 2006, p. 169). In his terminology, a
dialogue system S is for pure persuasion iff for any terminated dialogue d, agent a
is a winner for topic t (a 2 wtðdÞ) iff either a is a proponent of t and t 2 Ca0 ðdÞ for
all a0 who are either proponents or opponents of t, or a is an opponent of t and
t 62 Ca0 ðdÞ for all a0 who are either proponents or opponents of t. A dialogue system
S is for conflict resolution otherwise.
Where do obligationes fit in these schemes? Prakken says that frameworks for
persuasion dialogues can be found in the Middle Ages (Prakken 2006, p. 163, citing
Angelelli (1970)). Angelelli’s discussion of medieval disputations in Angelelli
(1970) focuses on obligationes, but nowhere does he make any mention of
persuasion. If obligationes are a type of persuasion dialogue, then because Opp’s
commitment store is always empty in an obligatio, obligationes would be classified,
on Prakken’s distinction, as conflict resolution dialogues instead of pure persuasion
dialogues. However, given the stated goal of obligationes and the fact that the
players agree on the truth value of the proposition in question at the start of the
dialogue, this classification does not seem appropriate.
Despite its breadth, the decempartite division of Cogan et al. (2006), incorpo-
rating Walton and Krabbe’s typology, also does not accommodate obligationes.
Because they are about the consistency of a formula, obligationes are not
negotiation or deliberation dialogues. Because the truth value of the proposition in
dispute is known to both, and the Opponent is not trying to persuade the Respondent
of anything, they are not information-seeking, inquiry, or pure persuasion dialogues.
Since they are not pugilistic in nature, they are not eristic dialogues. Nor are they
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any of the four new kinds introduced in Cogan et al. (2006), since those types
require as well that at least one party not know the truth-value of the proposition.14
Obligationes are somewhat similar to the ‘elicit-inform’ dialogue game of
Matheson and Ravenscroft (2001); Ravenscroft and Matheson (2002). These
dialogues were developed by Ravenscroft and Matheson in the context of
collaborative e-learning, where the dialogues are between a tutor system and a
student. The asymmetry between the players is similar to the asymmetry between
the Opponent and the Respondent. In an elicit-inform dialogue, the student is
questioned by the tutorial system, and ‘‘after reasoning about the learner’s
contributions, the tutor system either sanctions their explanations by informing them
they were correct, or points out that they were ‘incorrect’ and so informs them of a
consistent, or ‘correct’ answer’’ (Ravenscroft and Matheson 2002, p. 96). This is
very similar to the behavior of the Opponent when he calls Cedat tempus and
evaluates the actions of the Respondent to determine whether he has responded well
or badly. However, as elicit-inform dialogues have as their goal the persuasion of
the student to adopt a certain belief, they are not a perfect match for obligationes,
since persuasion is not at issue in obligational dialogues.
Instead of trying to shoehorn obligationes into a type of dialogue system already
introduced in the literature, we think it is more interesting, and highlights the unique
nature of obligational reasoning better, to consider them as introducing a new type
of dialogue into the typology. Thus, one of the contributions of the current paper is
the introduction of a new type of inter-agent dialogue, for checking the feasibility of
a set of propositions. Proving that a proposition or a set of propositions is feasible—
can be consistently maintained—has various applications in constraint and
allocation satisfaction, where a consistent solution meeting certain requirements
has to be found. Thus, the new dialogue type that we have introduced may turn out
to have useful applications beyond the context of obligationes, though we do not
investigate this potential extension further here.
7.3 The Role of (Dialectical) Obligations
One final point of interest, in comparing protocols based on obligationes to other
dialogue protocols, is the role of obligations (in the ordinary sense of the term) in
the dialogues. Generally, in a FDS, ‘‘[s]trictly speaking the only dialectical
obligation that a participant has is making an allowed move when it is one’s turn’’
(Prakken 2006, p. 170). In an obligatio, however, Res has a two-tiered obligation:
He is required to follow both the uniform protocol Pu, and the appropriate specific
14 However, were one to shift the basis on which dialogues are classified from the initial sentence(s)
being disputed to the overall goal of the dialogue, then it could be argued that obligationes are a type of
examination dialogue because the Respondent’s ability to follow the rules is being examined—a similar
suggestion is considered in the next paragraph—and thus, depending on the specific type of examination,
fall under either the inquiry or persuasion type. On such a view, it would make sense to understand an
obligational disputation as being one where the Respondent’s ability to follow the rules is being
examined, and thus it is either an inquiry into his abilities, or, if the Respondent and the Opponent differ
in their views of Respondent’s abilities, a persuasion by one player of the other. I’m grateful to one of the
anonymous referees for this suggestion.
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protocol for the type of obligatio he is in.15 It is possible for Res to violate his
obligation to follow the second protocol (in which case he loses), but if he does not
follow the uniform protocol than no disputation even takes place. This two-tiered
nature of the obligation of the Res helps us understand King’s analysis of
obligationes as a meta-methodology of argumentation. The specific protocol is the
methodology—it tells Res how to respond within a particular disputation—while
the general protocol constrains the types of specific protocols that are allowed, and
hence can be understood as a meta-methodology (a higher order method).
Furthermore, this two-tiered approach allows us to evaluate an obligatio at both
the descriptive and the formal level. Walton, following Hamblin, distinguishes
between the descriptive and the formal study of dialogue, and says that:
The descriptive study of dialogue is concerned with actual conversational
exchanges like parliamentary debates, legal cross-examinations, and so forth.
The formal study of dialogue ‘‘consists in the setting up of simple systems of
precise but not necessarily realistic rules, and the plotting out of the properties
of the dialogues that might be played out in accordance with them’’ (Hamblin
1970, p. 256) (Walton 2000, pp. 333–334).
At the descriptive level, we can study any obligational disputation from the point
of view of the uniform protocol; at the formal level, we can then evaluate such
disputations with respect to the rules the Respondent was required to follow, to
determine whether he has met his dialectical obligations or not. This distinction
parallels with the notion of the intrinsic and extrinsic goal of a dialogue
discussed by Gabbay and Woods. These distinctions are useful since they allow
that a dialogue ‘‘might fail to achieve the specific goal of a dialogue of a certain
type without ceasing to be a dialogue of that type’’ (Gabbay and Woods 2001, p.
162).
Additionally, in an obligatio there is no connection between an agent’s
commitment store and his assertions; Opp has no commitments, even though all
he makes are assertions, and Res makes no assertions, but his commitments are
generated from his concessions and denials of Opp’s assertions. This is a significant
difference from standard commitment rules such as the one discussed by Prakken in
his Paul and Olga example (Prakken 2006, p. 169). He says ‘‘As for commitment
rules, the following ones seem to be uncontroversial and can be found throughout
the literature:
• If sðmÞ ¼ claimðuÞ then Csðd; mÞ ¼ CsðdÞ [ fug. . . ’’
That is, an agent’s discursive commitments are generated from his assertions. A
similar position is advocated when he says elsewhere that ‘‘Commitments are typically
incurred by making or conceding claims and stating’’ (Prakken 2005, p. 1017).
15 The obligation to follow the uniform protocol is what Walton and Krabbe term an ‘action
commitment’: an obligation to execute a particular course of action, given the action(s) of the other
player(s) (Walton and Krabbe 1995, ch. 1).
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8 Conclusion
We have now seen how at least one type of medieval obligational theory can be
interpreted as giving rise to a formal dialogue system; it is straightforward to extend
this analysis not just to theories of positio outlined by other medieval authors but
also other types of obligationes, such as dubitatio, by varying the underlying
logic.16 The result of such an analysis shows that just as a particular dialogue can be
viewed as a game played according to a set of rules specified by a FDS (cf. Sect. 3),
so too obligationes can be naturally understood as giving the participants a
methodology of argumentation or reasoning to follow. By specifying the protocols
and rules of a FDS, a particular obligational theory gives participants a framework
within which to do philosophical analysis. This provides formal support for King’s
interpretation of obligationes as functioning at the meta-level, rather than at the
content level, and also shows, quite clearly, that Walton’s conclusion, that ‘‘after the
Greeks… the conversational model of argumentation faded into the background’’
(Walton 2000, p. 328), is false. We close our paper by pointing towards questions
that we hope to answer in future work.
In Sect. 6 we distinguished two ways ‘‘responds badly’’ or ‘‘responds well’’ can
be explicated. Both of these give rise to decision problems whose complexity we
intend to investigate in future work. In the first, the local winning outcome
conditions corresponds to the decision problem RESPONDS-WELL ðdn; MÞ defined as
follows: Given a finite obligatio dn and model M; check whether
M Cn ¼ h;; fM;Cna : a 2 Ag; VM;Cni; that is, whether Opp has locally won. The
answer is not necessarily a straightforward adaptation of complexity results for
model-checking in Public Announcement Logic (PAL, (van Ditmarsch et al. 2007,
ch. 4)), since in PAL, attention is restricted to announcements which are truthful,
and the introduction of announcements which may be false, but which are
nonetheless effective (in that they reduce the model), is not generally considered.
The fine-grained view asks whether, at each step n, Res has followed the specific
protocol he was obligated to follow. It is possible for Res to have responded
correctly in the sense of winning locally on the broad-grained view, but to still have
not followed the rules correctly, by choosing the wrong response for irrelevant
propositions, for example, by conceding an irrelevant proposition known to be false.
In this case, the decision problem RULE-FOLLOWING ðdn; P; MÞ is defined as follows:
Given a finite obligatio dn, protocol P, and model M check whether the construction
of Cn satisfies the conditions of P. It may be possible to extend the complexity
results of Parsons et al. (2002, 2003a, b), though it is not prima facie clear how this
would be done. In particular, the results in (Parsons et al. 2003b, §7) are for
argumentation-based logics, which DEL is not, and the results in (Parsons et al.
2002, §5–6) are for protocols where repetition is not allowed.
Acknowledgments This paper is an extended version of Uckelman (2011c). Research for this paper
was funded by the NWO project ‘‘Dialogical Foundations of Semantics’’ (DiFoS) in the ESF EuroCoRes
programme LogICCC (LogICCC-FP004; DN 231-80-002; CN 2008/08314/GW). The author would like
to thank both the anonymous referees and participants of the workshop Computational Models of Natural
16 The case of dubitatio is considered in Uckelman (2011a).
164 S. L. Uckelman
123
Argument X, August 2010, for their meticulous and useful comments on an earlier version of this paper,
and also the two anonymous referees who provided further detailed and helpful comments on this
extended version.
Open Access This article is distributed under the terms of the Creative Commons Attribution License
which permits any use, distribution, and reproduction in any medium, provided the original author(s) and
the source are credited.
References
Angelelli, I. 1970. Techniques of disputation in the history of logic. Journal of Philosophy 67(20):
800–815.
Baker, M. 2000. The role and models in artificial intelligence and educational research: A prospective
view. International Journal of Artificial Intelligence in Education 11: 122–143.
Boehner, P. 1952. Medieval logic: An outline of its development from 1250 to c. 1400. Manchester:
Manchester University Press.
Bondarenko, A., P.M. Dung, R.A. Kowalski, and F. Toni. 1997. An abstract, argumentation-theoretic
approach to default reasoning. Artificial Intelligence 93: 63–101.
Braakhuis, H. 1998. Obligations in early 13th century Paris: The obligationes of Nicholas of Paris (?).
Vivarium 36(2): 152–233.
Brewka, G. 2001. Dynamic argument systems: A formal model of argumentation processes based on
situation calculus. Journal of Logic and Computation 11(2): 257–282.
Burley, W. 1963. Tractatus de obligationibus. In An introduction to the logical treatise ‘De
Obligationibus’ with critical texts of William of Sherwood (?) and Walter Burley, Louvain, ed.
R. Green.
Burley, W. 1988. Obligations (selections). In Cambridge translations of medieval philosophical texts, vol.
1: Logic and the philosophy of language, ed. N. Kretzmann, and E. Stump, 369–412. Cambridge:
Cambridge University Press.
Cogan, E., S. Parsons, and P. McBurney. 2005. What kind of argument are we going to have today? In
Proceedings of the Fourth International Joint Conference on Autonomous Agents and Multiagent
Systems.
Cogan, E., S. Parsons, and P. McBurney. 2006. New types of inter-agent dialogues. In Argumentation in
multi-agent systems, LNAI 4049, ed. S. Parsons, N. Maudet, P. Moraitis, and I. Rahwan, 154–168.
Berlin: Springer.
de Rijk, L.M. 1974. Some thirteenth century tracts on the game of obligation. Vivarium 12(2): 94–123.
de Rijk, L.M. 1975. Some thirteenth century tracts on the game of obligation II. Vivarium 13(1): 22–54.
de Rijk, L.M. 1976. Some thirteenth century tracts on the game of obligation III. Vivarium 14(1): 26–49.
Dutilh Novaes, C. 2007. Formalizing medieval logical theories: Suppositio, consequentiae and
obligationes. Logic, Epistemology, and the Unity of Science, vol. 7. Berlin: Springer.
Gabbay, D., and J. Woods. 2001. Non-cooperation in dialogue logic. Synthese 127(1–2): 161–186.
Girle, R.A. 1996. Commands in dialogue logic. In Practical reasoning: Proceedings of the First
International Conference on Formal and Applied Practical Reasoning (FAPR 1996), LNAI 1085,
ed. D.M. Gabbay, and H.J. Ohlbach, 246–260. Bonn, Germany: Springer
Hamblin, C.L. 1970. Fallacies. London: Methuen.
Hamblin, C. 1971. Mathematical models of dialogue. Theoria 37: 130–155.
Harel, D., D. Kozen, and J. Tiuryn. 2002. Dynamic logic. In Handbook of philosophical logic, 2nd ed.,
vol. 4, ed. D.M. Gabbay and F. Guenther. The Netherlands: Kluwer.
Karunatillake, N.C., N.R. Jennings, I. Rahwan, and P. McBurney. 2009. Dialogue games that agents play
within a society. Artificial Intelligence 173: 935–981.
King, P. 1991. Medieval thought-experiments: The metamethodology of mediaeval science. In Thought
experiments in science and philosophy, ed. T. Horowitz and G.J. Massey, 43–64. Lanham, MD:
Rowman & Littlefield.
King, P. 2004. Opposing and responding: Comments on Paul Spade. Preprint. http://individual.utoronto.
ca/pking/presentations/Spade_Comments.pdf.
Lorenzen, P., and K. Lorenz. 1978. Dialogische Logik. Wissenschaftliche Buchgesellschaft.
Medieval Disputationes de obligationibus as Formal Dialogue Systems 165
123
Matheson, M., and A. Ravenscroft. 2001. Evaluating and investigating learning through collaborative
argumentation: An empirical study. Technical report DDRG-01–01. Milton Keynes: The Open
University.
Maudet, N. 2003. Negotiating dialogue games. Autonomous Agents and Multi-Agent Systems 7: 229–233.
McBurney, P., and S. Parsons. 2002. Games that agents play: A formal framework for dialogues between
autonomous agents. Journal of Logic, Language and Information 11: 315–334.
McBurney, P., and S. Parsons. 2009. Dialogue games for agent argumentation. In Argumentation in
artificial intelligence, ed. I. Rahwan, and G. Simari, 261–280. Berlin: Springer.
McBurney, P., S. Parsons, and M. Wooldridge. 2002. Desiderata for agent argumentation protocols.
In Proceedings of AAMAS’02, July 15–19, 2002, Bologna, Italy, 402–409.
Ockham, W. 1974. Opera philosophica, vol I. St. Bonaventure: Franciscan Institute.
Parsons, S., M. Wooldridge, and L. Amgoud. 2002. An analysis of formal inter-agent dialogues.
In Proceedings of AAMAS’02, July 15–19, 2002, Bologna, Italy, 394–401.
Parsons, S., M. Wooldridge, and L. Amgoud. 2003a. On the outcomes of formal inter-agent dialogues.
In Proceedings of the 2nd International Conference on Autonomous Agents and Multi-Agent
Systems, Melbourne.
Parsons, S., M. Wooldridge, and L. Amgoud. 2003b. Properties and complexity of some formal inter-
agent dialogues. Journal of Logic and Computation 13(3): 347–376.
Prakken, H. 2005. Coherence and flexibility in dialogue games for argumentation. Journal of Logic and
Computation 15(6): 1009–1040.
Prakken, H. 2006. Formal systems for persuasion dialogue. Knowledge Engineering Review 21(2):
163–188.
Ravenscroft, A., and M.P. Matheson. 2002. Developing and evaluating dialogue games for collaborative
e-learning. Journal of Computer Assisted Learning 18(1): 93–101.
Sklar, E., and S. Parsons. 2004. Toward the application of argumentation-based dialogues for education.
In Proceedings of the 3rd International Conference on Autonomous Agents and Multi-Agent
Systems, ed. C. Sierra and E. Sonenberg.
Spade, P.V. 2000. Why don’t medieval logicians ever tell us what they’re doing? Or, what is this, a
conspiracy?, preprint, http://pvspade.com/Logic/docs/Conspiracy.pdf.
Spade, P.V. 2008. Medieval theories of obligationes. In Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy, fall 2008
edn, ed. E.N. Zalta http://plato.stanford.edu/archives/fall2008/entries/obligationes/.
Spade, P.V. 1993. Unpublished talk on obligationes presented at the Midwestern Division of the
American Philosophical Association.
Uckelman, S.L. 2011a. Deceit and indefeasible knowledge: The case of dubitatio. Journal of Applied
Non-Classical Logics 21(3/4): 503–519.
Uckelman, S.L. 2011b. A dynamic epistemic logic approach to modeling obligationes. In LIRa Yearbook,
Institute for Logic, Language & Computation, ed. D. Grossi, S. Minica, B. Rodenha¨user, and S.
Smets, 147–172.
Uckelman, S.L. 2011c. Obligationes as formal dialogue systems. In STAIRS 2010: Proceedings of the
Fifth Starting AI Researcher’s Symposium, ed. T. A˚gotnes, 341–354. IOS Press.
Uckelman, S.L. 2012. Interactive logic in the Middle Ages. Logic and Logical Philosophy (Forthcoming).
van Ditmarsch, H., W. van der Hoek, and B. Kooi. 2007. Dynamic epistemic logic. Synthese Library
Series, vol. 337. Berlin: Springer.
Walton, D. 2000. The place of dialogue theory in logic, computer science, and communication studies.
Synthese 123(3): 327–346.
Walton, D.N., and E.C.W. Krabbe. 1995. Commitment in dialogue: Basic concepts of interpersonal
reasoning. Albany: State University of New York Press.
Yrjo¨nsuuri, M. 1993. The role of casus in some fourteenth century treatises on sophismata and
obligations. In Argumentationstheorie. Scholastische Forschungen zu den logischen und semantis-
chen Regeln korrekten Folgerns, Brill, ed. K. Jacobi, 301–321.
Yrjo¨nsuuri, M. 1994. Obligationes: 14th century logic of disputational duties, Acta Philosophica Fennica,
vol. 55. Societatis Philosophia Fennica.
Yrjo¨nsuuri, M. (ed.) 2001. Medieval formal logic. The Netherlands: Kluwer.
166 S. L. Uckelman
123
